cultures store ideas and inventions, and people's "decisions" (often unconscious) about which ideas to adopt and which to reject shape the content of a culture. Evolutionary theories may help explain why, for example, traditional Fang religious beliefs are replaced by alternative beliefs like Christianity or Islam. However to understand the structures of complex, adaptive cultural practices, religious beliefs, tools or institutions, you have to understand the evolved psychology of the mind that gave rise to that complexity, and how that psychology interacts with its environment.
Students of the history of biology will recognize this picture of cultural evolution as similar to a frequently popular, but incorrect theory of genetic evolution. Very few of Darwin's contemporaries accepted (or even understood) his idea that adaptations arose through the gradual accumulation of small variations. Some of his most ardent supporters, like T. H. Huxley, thought that new types arose in big jumps, and then natural selection determined which types spread. In this century, Richard Goldschmidt and the late Steven J. Gould among others championed this theory of evolution. It is wrong because the likelihood that a complex adaptation will arise by chance is nil. Of course, this objection does have not any force for cultural evolution precisely because innovations are highly nonrandom, and thus it is quite plausible that cultural evolution mainly involves the culling of innovations, innovations whose adaptive complexity can only be understood only in terms of human psychology.
Culture often evolves by the accumulation of small variations
This picture is a useful antidote to the view that cultural evolution is just like genetic evolution.
Cultural variation is not transmitted in the same way as genes-ideas are not poured from one head into another. These evolutionary psychologists are surely right that every form of learning, including social learning, requires an information-rich innate psychology, and that some of the adaptive complexity we see in cultures around the world stems from of this information. Nor does culture evolve through the gradual accumulation of "memes," gene-like particles that arise through blind mutations and spread by natural selection. Innovations are not purely random, and our evolved psychology certainly must influence the rate and direction of cultural adaptation.
Plausibly some cultural adaptations, especially relatively simple ones, are invented in one step by individuals. Only a few good easy ways to tie a knot that makes a loop in the end of a rope are currently known. Some individual might invent new, and perhaps better one.
However, we think that it is much less plausible that most complex cultural adaptations, things like kayaks and institutions like hxaro exchange, arise in this way. Isaac Newton famously remarked "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of giants." For most innovators in most places at most times in human history a different metaphor is closer to the truth. Even the greatest human innovators are, in the great scheme of things, midgets standing on the shoulders of a vast pyramid of other midgets. Individual minds rarely give birth to complex cultural adaptations. The evolution of languages, artifacts, and institutions can be divided up into many small steps, and during each step, the changes are relatively modest. No single innovator contributes more than a small portion of the total, as any single gene substitution contributes only marginally to a complex organic adaptation.
The history of technology shows that complex artifacts like watches are not hopeful monsters created by single inventors (Basalla 1988) . The watchmakers' skills have been built up piecemeal by the cumulative improvement of technologies at the hands of many innovators each contributing a small improvement to the ultimately amazing instrument. Many competing innovations have been tried out at each step, most now forgotten except by historians of technology. A little too loosely we think, historians of technology liken invention to mutation because both create variation and compare the rise of the successful technology to prominence with the action of natural selection. Forget watches for a moment. The historian of technology Henry Petroski (1992) documents how even simple modern artifacts like forks, pins, paper clips and zippers evolve haltingly through many trials, some to capture the market's attention and others to fall by the wayside. No one knows how many failed designs languished on inventors' workbenches. Cultural evolution is more complicated than bare-bones random variation and selective retention. To anticipate our argument, the decisions, choices, and preferences of individuals act at the population level as forces that shape cultural evolution, along with other processes like natural selection. We urge great care with loose analogies to mutation and selection because there are several distinct processes rooted in human decision-making that lead to the accumulation of beneficial cultural variations, each with a distinctive twist of its own and none exactly like natural selection.
While human innovations are not like random mutations, they have been until recently small, incremental steps. The design of a watch is not the work of an individual inventor but the product of a watch-making tradition from which the individual watchmaker derives most, but not quite all, of his designs. This is not to take anything away from the real heroes of watch-making innovation like John Harrison. Harrison delivered a marine chronometer accurate enough to calculate longitude at sea to the British Board of Longitude in 1759. He used every device of the standard clockmakers art and a number of clever tricks borrowed from other technologies of the time, such as using bimetallic strips (you have seen them coiled behind the needle of oven thermometers and thermostats) for compensating the critical temperature sensitive timekeeping elements of his chronometers. His achievement is notable for the sheer number of clever innovations he made-the bimetallic temperature compensators, a superb escapement, jewel bearings requiring no lubrication, substitutes for the pendulum. It is also notable for his extraordinary personal dedication to the task. By dint of 37 years of unremitting effort and a first-rate mechanical mind, sustained by incremental payments against a British Admiralty prize he was a good candidate to win, he made a series of ever smaller, better, more rugged seagoing clocks. Eventually he delivered "Number 4"with an accuracy of better than 1/40 th of a second per day, significant improvement over one minute per day for the best watches of his day (Sobel 1995 Smith invented little and borrowed much although we properly credit him with being a great religious innovator. His innovations were, like Harrison's, large compared to those introduced by most other ambitious preachers.
Individuals are smart, but most of the cultural artifacts that we use, the social institutions that shape our lives, and the languages that we speak, are far too complex for even the most gifted innovator to create from scratch. Religious innovations are a lot like mutations, and successful religions are adapted in sophisticated ways beyond the ken of individual innovators.
The small frequency of successful innovations suggests that most innovations degrade the adaptation of a religious tradition and only a lucky few improve it. We don't mean to say at that complex cultural institutions can't ever be improved by the application of rational thought.
Human innovations are not completely blind, and if we understood cultural evolutionary processes better they would be less blind. But human cultural institutions are very complex and rarely have been improved in large steps by individual innovators.
Culture permits adaptation to a wide range of environments without domain specific modules
Cultural adaptation has played a crucial role in human evolution. Humans can live in a wider range of environments than other primates because culture allows the relatively rapid accumulation of better strategies for exploiting local environment compared to genetic inheritance. Consider "learning" in the most general sense; every adaptive system "learns" about its environment by one mechanism or another. Learning involves a tradeoff between accuracy and generality. Learning mechanisms generate contingent behavior based on "observations" of the environment. The machinery that maps observations onto behavior is the "learning mechanism." One learning mechanism is more accurate than another in a particular environment if it generates more adaptive behavior in that environment. A learning mechanism is more general than another if it generates adaptive behavior in a wider range of environments. Typically, there is a tradeoff between accuracy and generality because every learning mechanism requires prior knowledge about which environmental cues are good predictors of the actual state of the environment and what behaviors are best in each environment. The more detailed and specific such knowledge is for a particular environment, the more accurate is the learning rule. Thus for a given amount of stored knowledge, a learning mechanism can either have detailed information about a few environments, or less detailed information about many environments.
In most animals, this knowledge is stored in the genes, including of course the genes that control individual learning. Consider the following thought experiment: Pick a wide-ranging primate species, let's say baboons. Then capture a group of baboons, and move them to another part of the natural range of baboons in which the environment is as different as possible. You might, for example, transplant a group from the lush wetlands of the Okavango Delta to the harsh desert of western Namibia. Next, compare their behavior to the behavior of other baboons living in the same environment. We believe that after a little while the experimental group of baboons would be quite similar to their neighbors. The reason that the local and transplanted baboons would be similar, we think, is the same reason that baboons are less variable than humans: they acquire a great deal of information about how to be a baboon genetically-it is hard wired. To be sure, they have to learn where things are, where to sleep, which foods are desirable, and which are not, but they can do this without contact with already knowledgeable baboons because they have the basic knowledge built in. They can't learn to live in temperate forests or arctic tundra because their learning systems don't include enough innate information to cope with those environments.
Human culture allows learning mechanisms to be both more accurate and more general, because cumulative cultural adaptation provides accurate and more detailed information about local environments. Evolutionary psychologists argue that our psychology is built of complex, information rich, evolved modules that are adapted for the hunting and gathering life that almost all humans pursued up to a few thousand years ago. Fair enough, but individual humans can't learn how to live in the Arctic, the Kalahari, or anywhere else. The reason is that our information rich, evolved psychology doesn't contain the necessary information. Think about being plunked down on an arctic beach with a pile of driftwood and seal skins and trying to make a kayak. You already know a lot-what a kayak looks like, roughly how big it is, and something about its construction. Nonetheless, you would almost certainly fail (We're not trying to dis you; we've read a lot about kayak construction, and we'd make a poor specimen, if we were lucky). And, supposing you did make a passable kayak, you'd still have a dozen or so similar tools to master before you could make a contribution to the Inuit economy. And then there are the social mores of the Inuit to master. The Inuit could make kayaks, and do all the other things that they needed to do to stay alive, because they could make use of a vast pool of useful information available in the behavior and teachings of other people in their population.
The reason the information contained in this pool is adaptive is that combination of learning and cultural transmission leads to relatively rapid, cumulative adaptation. Populations of people connected over time by social learning can accumulate the solutions to problems that no individual could do on their own. Individuals don't have to be too smart, because simple heuristics like correlation detection and imitation of the successful can produce clever adaptations when averaged over a population of individuals and over generations of time. Even if most individuals imitate with only the occasional application of some simple heuristic, many individuals will be giving traditions a nudge in an adaptive direction, on average. Cultural transmission preserves the many small nudges, and exposes the modified traditions to another round of nudging. Very rapidly by the standards of ordinary evolutionary time, and more rapidly than evolution by natural selection alone, weak, general purpose decision-making forces generate new adaptations. The complexity of cultural traditions can explode to the limits of our capacity to imitate or be taught them, far past our ability to make careful, detailed decisions about them. We let the population level process of cultural evolution do the heavy lifting for us.
Cumulative cultural adaptation involves a trade-off
As far as many evolutionary social scientists are concerned are concerned, Richard Dawkins is way up in the pantheon of contemporary evolutionary thinkers. (For sure, he makes most top 5
lists.) Nonetheless, most place little stock in Dawkins' argument about rogue memes, regarding it as an imaginative device for explaining the nature of replicators, rather than a serious proposal about human cultural evolution. Instead, they tend to think that all forms of learning are processes whereby the organism exploits statistical regularities in the environment so as to develop a phenotype that is well suited to the present environment. Over time, selection shapes psychology (and other processes as well) so that it uses predictive cues to generate adaptive behavior. Social learning is just another learning mechanism that exploits cues available in the social environment. As a result, to oversimplify just a bit, most evolutionary social scientists expect people to learn things that were good for them in the Pleistocene and perhaps in the smaller-scale human societies that resemble those of the Pleistocene. Adaptation arises from the information processing capacities built into the human brain by natural selection acting on genes.
These mechanisms may give rise to maladaptive behaviors nowadays, but it's got nothing to do with culture and everything to with the fact that "environments" are far outside of the parameters to which our innate decision-making talents are calibrated. . chemist's laboratory on the tip of you tongue, one that could separately sense every possible harmful and helpful plant compound rather than having just four very general taste senses. Some animals are much better at these things than humans-we have a rather poor sense of smell for example. But the number of natural organic compounds is immense, and selection favors compromises that usually result in adaptive behavior and don't cost too much. A fancy sense of smell requires a long muzzle to contain the sensory epithelium where all those fancy sensory neurons are deployed, and plenty of blood flow to feed them. Bitter taste is a reasonably accurate and reasonably general sense for screening substances for edibility, but it is far from a food chemist's laboratory or a dog's nose. To get the good, you have to risk adopting the bad because the evaluative machinery the brain deploys to exercise the various biases is necessarily limited.
Let's see why.
Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 104) define an adaptation as, "a reliably developing structure in the organism, which, because it meshes with the recurrent structure of the world, causes the solution to an adaptive problem." They give behavioral examples like inbreeding avoidance, the avoidance of plant toxins during pregnancy, and the negotiation of social exchange. Evolutionary psychologists are prone to wax eloquent over marvelous cognitive adaptations created by natural selection. And they are right to marvel; everyone should. Natural selection has created brains and sensory systems that easily solve problems that stump the finest engineers. Making robots that can do anything sensible in a natural environment is exceedingly difficult, yet a tiny ant with a few thousand neurons can meander over rough ground hundreds of meters from its nest, find food, and return beeline to feed its sisters. Humans are able to solve many astoundingly difficult problems as they go through daily life because natural selection has created numerous adaptive information processing modules in the human brain. Notably, the best examples involve tasks that have confronted every member of our lineage in every environment over tens of millions of years of evolution, things like visual processing and making inferences about causal processes.
moderate temperatures, living creatures, human-made artifacts, and small social groups.
However, it is domain general in the sense that there is nothing in our evolved psychology that contains the specific details that make a difference in the case of kayaks-knowledge of the dimensions, materials, and construction methods that make the difference between constructing a 15 kg craft that safely skims across the arctic seas and death by drowning, hypothermia, or starvation. These crucial details were stored in the brains of each generation of Inuit, Yupik, and Aleut peoples. They were preserved and improved by the action of a population of evolved psychologies, but using mechanisms that are equally useful for preserving a vast array of other kinds of knowledge.
Such widely applicable learning mechanisms are necessarily more error prone than highly constrained, domain specific ones. As Tooby and Cosmides (1992: 104-108) have emphasized, broad general problems are much more difficult to solve than simple constrained ones. A kayak is a highly complex object, with many different attributes or "dimensions." What frame geometry is best? Should there be a keel? How should the components of the frame be joined?
What kind of animal provides the best skin? Which sex? Harvested at what time of year?
Designing a good kayak means finding one of the very few combination of attributes that successfully produces this highly specialized boat. The number of combinations of attributes grows geometrically as the number of dimensions increases, rapidly exploding into an immense number. The problem would be much easier if we had a kayak module that constrained the problem, so we would have fewer choices to evaluate. However, evolution cannot adopt this solution because environments are changing far too quickly and are far too variable spatially for selection to shape the psychologies of arctic populations in this way. The same learning psychology has to do for kayaks, oil lamps, waterproof clothing, snow houses, and all the other technology necessary to survive in the arctic. It also has to do for birch bark canoes, reed rafts, dugout canoes, planked rowboats, rabbit drives, blow-guns, hxaro exchange and the myriad marvelous, specialized, environment-specific technologies that human hunter gatherers have culturally evolved.
For the same reason it is impossible to build a learning device that is both generalpurpose and powerful, selection cannot shape social learning mechanisms so that they reliably reject maladaptive beliefs over the whole range of human experience. A young Aleut cannot readily evaluate whether the kayaks he sees his father and cousins using are better than alternative designs. He can try one or two modifications and see how they work, and he can compare the performance of the different designs he sees. But small samples and noisy data will When it is difficult to determine which cultural variant is best, natural selection favors heavy reliance on imitating others and low confidence in one's own experience Richerson 1985, 1988 As the effects of biases weaken, social learning becomes more and more like a system of inheritance. Much of an individual's behavior is thus a product of beliefs, skills, ethical norms, and social attitudes that are acquired from others with little if any modification. To predict how individuals will behave, one must know something about their cultural milieu. This does not mean that the evolved predispositions that underlie individual learning become unimportant.
Without the ability to taste and dislike bitter substances, and many similar innate senses and predilections, cultural evolution would be uncoupled from genetic evolution. It would provide none of the fitness enhancing advantages that normally shape cultural evolution and produce adaptations. However, once cultural variation is heritable, it can respond to selection for behaviors that conflict with genetic fitness. Selection on genes that regulate the cultural system may still favor the ability and inclination to rely on imitation because it is beneficial on average.
Selection will balance the advantages of imitation against the risk of catching pathological superstitions. Our propensity to adopt dangerous beliefs may be the price we pay for marvelous power of cumulative cultural adaptation. As the saying goes, you get what you pay for.
Culture, Adaptation and Innateness
We conclude by arguing that this way of thinking about cultural adaptation has implications for the topic of this volume, the notion of innateness.
One of Darwinism's central accomplishments is the explanation of design-spectacularly improbable "organs of extreme perfection" like the animal eyes are explained by the gradual accumulation of the genes that give rise to these traits through the process of natural election.
While the development of such complex, highly functional trait always depends on the interaction of genes and environment, the design information that causes functional eyes to develop generation after generation comes from the genes. The eyes of a cod and an octopus are similar in design (Land and Nilsson 2002): both have spherical lenses which are located about 2.5 lens radii from the retina; in both the index of refraction of those lenses gradually increases toward their center. In both species, the eyes are oriented by six muscle groups, one pair for each independent axis of rotation, and in both different muscles adjust the focus by moving the lens.
These structures evolved independently, and develop quite differently. To be sure, environmental inputs will be crucial-the development of functional eyes depends on light input, for example.
But the design of these eyes can only be explained in terms of natural selection acting on the genes that control this development. Put another way, design doesn't come from the environment, it is innate.
The same argument applies to complex, adaptive behavior in most organisms. Like the development of eyes, behavior arises from the interaction of the environment with innate, genetically transmitted developmental mechanisms, especially various forms of learning. Simple, relatively domain-general mechanisms such as classical conditioning can shape behavior in adaptive ways, but, if evolutionary psychologists are right, they are unlikely to generate the many forms of highly complex adaptive behavior seen in nature. Behaviors like the long distance stellar navigation of indigo buntings or the spectacular feats of memory of acorn woodpeckers require a highly structured, information rich psychology. The design latent in this psychology comes from the genes, and the details of this design are explained by the action of natural selection.
The cumulative cultural evolution of spectacular human adaptations like kayaks, bows and arrows and the like complicate this picture. Now there are two processes that generate design, natural selection acting on genes, and a variety of processes acting on culturally transmitted variation. If we are right, cultural adaptation has allowed the human species to adapt to a wide range of environments because its design information is stored in brains, not genes.
By linking the efforts of many people over many generations, relative crude, relatively domain general mechanisms can generate cultural adaptations to wide range of environments much more rapidly than natural selection can generate genetic adaptations. True, cultural adaptation depends on the evolved psychological mechanisms that allow social learning, and, again if the evolutionary psychologists are right, the learning mechanisms that shape cultural adaptations over time depends on a large number of evolved psychological mechanisms. However, unlike other forms of learning, the design information that generates the adaptations is not stored in the genes.
Thus in cultural organisms becomes interesting to ask in any particular case, where does the design come from, "inside" from genes shaped by natural selection, or "outside" from adaptive, cumulatively evolved information stored in other human brains. The right question is not is it nature or nurture? But, is it genes or culture? The answer to this question is interesting because the dynamic processes that lead to cultural adaptation can lead to systematically different outcomes than natural selection acting on genetic variation (Richerson and Boyd, in press ). Some of these differences are adaptive. Culture evolves faster than genes and can track more rapidly varying environments. Symbolic marking divides human populations up into semiisolated "pseudo-species" that adapt finely to their local environment, resisting the cultural analog of gene flow from other environments. Some of these differences are maladaptive. The fact that much culture is transmitted non-parentally allows considerable scope for the evolution of selfish memes. A theory of how evolving genes interact with environments to determine behavior is adequate for most organisms, but in humans evolving culture is an essential part of the explanatory problem.
